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Abstract: Thomas Pogge claims “that, by shaping and enforcing the social conditions that 
foreseeably and avoidably cause the monumental suffering of global poverty, we are harming 
the global poor – or, to put it more descriptively, we are active participants in the largest, 
though not the gravest, crime against humanity ever committed.” In other words, he claims 
that by upholding certain international arrangements we are violating our strong negative duties 
not to harm, and not just some (perhaps much weaker) positive duties to help. I shall argue 
that even if Pogge were correct in claiming that certain rich states or at least the rich states 
collectively violate certain negative duties towards the poor and harm the poor, he is far too 
hasty in concluding that “we,” the citizens of those states, are thus harming the global poor or 
violating our negative duties towards them. In fact, his conclusion can be shown to be wrong 
not least of all in the light of some of his own assumptions about collective responsibility, the 
enforceability of human rights, and terrorism. In addition, I will also argue that his view that 
we share responsibility for the acts of our political “representatives,” who allegedly act “on our 
behalf,” is unwarranted.
Key words: collective responsibility, harm, individual responsibility, negative duties, Pogge, 
political representation, poverty.
Thomas Pogge claims “that, by shaping and enforcing the social conditions that 
foreseeably and avoidably cause the monumental suffering of global poverty, we are 
harming the global poor – or, to put it more descriptively, we are active participants in the 
largest, though not the gravest, crime against humanity ever committed.” (Pogge 2005a, 
33) In other words, he claims that by upholding certain international arrangements we are 
violating our strong negative duties not to harm, and not just some (perhaps much weaker) 
positive duties to help. Therefore, he thinks that we, the citizens of the rich countries, are 
misguided in perceiving the problem of world poverty primarily in terms of (lacking) 
assistance or charity rather than in terms of our active, criminal contribution to the 
problem. We are not only not doing much against poverty, we are actually to a large extent 
producing it – poverty’s executors, as it were. I shall argue in this paper that Pogge’s claim 
is unwarranted and wrong. In particular, I shall argue that even if Pogge were correct 
in claiming that certain rich states or at least the rich states collectively violate certain 
negative duties towards the poor and harm the poor, he is far too hasty in concluding that 
“we,” the citizens of those states, are thus harming the global poor or violating our negative 
duties towards them. In fact, his conclusion can be shown to be wrong not least of all in the 
light of some of his own assumptions.
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I. THE THREE STRANDS OF POGGE’S ARGUMENT
Let me begin by first giving a brief sketch of Pogge’s argument (following his own 
crystal-clear summary in “Real World Justice”). The first step “is to show that our world 
is pervaded by [...] ‘radical inequality.’” Radical inequality means that the worse-off are 
very badly off in absolute as well as in relative terms and that it is difficult or impossible 
for the worse-off to substantially improve their lot. Further, this inequality affects most or 
all aspects of the life of the worse-off and, most importantly, it is avoidable: “The better-off 
can improve the circumstances of the worse-off without becoming badly off themselves.” 
(2005, 37) I have no criticism of this first step.
Pogge then presents “in parallel three second steps of the argument, each of which 
shows in a different way that the existing radical inequality involves us in harming the 
global poor.” (2005a, 37). These three second steps refer to the effects of a common and 
violent history, to uncompensated exclusion from the use of natural resources and to the 
effects of shared social institutions.
The first strand of the second step attempts to appeal to readers who are attracted 
to historical-entitlement conceptions of justice, and emphasizes that “the social starting 
positions of the worse-off and the better-off have emerged from a single historical process 
that was pervaded by massive grievous wrongs.” And he claims: 
[This] approach is independent of the others. For suppose we reject the other two 
approaches and affirm that radical inequality is morally acceptable when it comes 
about pursuant to rules of the game that are morally at least somewhat plausible 
and observed at least for the most part. The existing radical inequality is then still 
condemned by the [first] approach on the ground that the rules were in fact massively 
violated through countless horrible crimes whose momentous effect cannot be 
surgically neutralized decades and centuries later. (2002, 203-4)
Moreover:
In short, then, upholding a radical inequality counts as harming the worse-off when 
the historical path on which this inequality arose is pervaded by grievous wrongs. 
(2005a, 38)
With the second strand of his argument Pogge explicitly wants to cater to Lockeans. 
(2005a, 38) He explains:
Locke is assuming that, in a state of nature without money, persons are subject to the 
moral constraint that their unilateral appropriations must always leave “enough and 
as good” for others [...]. This so-called Lockean Proviso may, however, be lifted [...] if 
all can rationally consent to the alteration, that is, only if everyone will be better off 
under the new rules than anyone would be under the old. (2002, 22)
The better-off – we – are harming the worse-off insofar as the radical inequality we 
uphold excludes the global poor from a proportional share of the world’s natural 
resources and any equivalent. (2005a, 40)
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The third strand is to appeal to consequentialists. Pogge says:
On my ecumenical response to broadly consequentialist conceptions of social justice, 
we are harming the global poor if and insofar as we collaborate in imposing unjust 
social institutions upon them; and institutions are certainly unjust if and insofar as 
they foreseeably give rise to large-scale avoidable underfulfillment of human rights. 
(2005a, 46)
As Pogge emphasizes, this third strand is not addressed to libertarians. However, it 
seems to me that a libertarian – and most other people – might well agree that imposing 
on others an institutional order that will make them victims of infringements upon their 
rights is – under certain circumstances – harming them.
In any case, Pogge claims that the international institutional order is predominantly 
shaped by the rich countries, often in collaboration with the corrupt elites of the poor 
countries. The detrimental institutions of the international order include the resource 
privilege and the borrowing privilege. These privileges confer upon a group in power “the 
power to effect legally valid transfers of ownership rights in such resources” and “to 
impose internationally valid legal obligations [of paying back debts made, for example, 
by a dictatorial regime] upon the country at large” (2004, 270-71). Pogge rightly says 
that these privileges “provide strong incentives to potential predators (military officers, 
most frequently) to take power by force” and to oppress their people and divert state 
revenues into their own pockets (2005a, 49). Moreover, with tax laws the rich countries 
have contributed to the bribery of elites in poor countries, and by insisting “on continued 
and asymmetrical protections of their markets through tariffs, quotas, anti-dumping 
duties, export credits, and subsidies to domestic producers, greatly impairing the export 
opportunities of even the very poorest countries [...] these protections certainly account 
for a sizeable fraction of the 270 million poverty deaths since 1989.” (2005a, 50)
II. INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY UNPROVEN
I now want to provide an argument that undermines – indeed, I think, refutes – all 
three strands of Pogge’s argument at once.1 I shall do so by focusing the attention on a 
structural flaw in Pogge’s argument: his argument consists of two steps – but it needs at 
least three. In his first step Pogge establishes the fact of radical inequality. In his second 
step he establishes at best the responsibility of some individual rich countries (but perhaps 
only the responsibility of the rich countries as a collective) for this radical inequality. Thus, 
what he fails to offer is a third (or perhaps fourth) step establishing the responsibility of 
the individual citizens of the rich countries (and before that, perhaps, their collective 
responsibility), that is, their responsibility in terms of the violation of a negative duty or in 
terms of inflicting harm.
1] In a sister paper to this one (“Are We Violating Our Negative Duties Towards the Global Poor? A 
Critique of the Three Strands of Pogge’s Argument,” unpublished ms.) I also criticize the three strands separately. 
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Note that the first two strands of Pogge’s argument ultimately come down to the 
accusation that “we” are “upholding” the radical inequality Pogge criticizes; while the third 
strand accuses us of “collaborating in imposing unjust social institutions.” However, it is 
anything but clear how “we” “uphold” the radical inequality. I, personally, am actually not 
aware of “upholding” it. And as regards imposing unjust social institutions, Pogge refers, 
as I explained, to the resource privilege, the borrowing privilege and to certain unfair 
tariffs and trade regulations. But how exactly do I (or you) “collaborate in imposing” these 
institutions? It might be plausible to claim that rich countries uphold the radical inequality 
or collaborate in imposing unjust social institutions, but to show that “we” do these things 
too, and that we do so in a way that can really count as harming the global poor or as 
violating our negative duties towards them would most certainly require a very significant 
amount of argument.
On the Gap between Collective and Individual Responsibility
However, in my view, Pogge is too quick in moving from the responsibility of 
governments to that of citizens.2 He takes this step – or leap, rather – literally between 
commas, talking, for example, about “the global institutional order for which our 
governments, hence we, bear primary responsibility” (2002, 13, my emphasis) or affirming 
that “the conduct of our elected representatives” is “our conduct” (2008, 22, Pogge’s 
emphasis).
Yet, the assertion that if our governments bear “primary responsibility,” we do as 
well, is clearly mistaken. First of all, “My government bears primary responsibility for X” 
does certainly not entail “I and my compatriots bear primary responsibility for X.” For 
example, the government might do something we asked it not to do. Why should we then 
automatically be responsible for what it has done? Or what happens if my government 
decides to unjustly kill me? It is obviously wrong to say that my compatriots and I bear 
primary responsibility for my murder. The same holds if my government decides to kill 
me and my girlfriend. It is still obviously wrong that my compatriots and I bear primary 
responsibility for our murders. Nothing changes if my girlfriend is a foreigner. To say 
that that suddenly completely changes the story and now does confer upon me primary 
responsibility for her murder seems to be little more than a belief in magic. But then, what 
is the difference if the foreigner to be killed together with me is not even my girlfriend nor 
anyone I know at all? Why should that now confer primary responsibility on me? There is 
no discernible reason.
Second of all, the fact that our government violated a negative duty towards foreigners 
does not mean, for purely logical reasons, that we have also violated a negative duty. For 
example, maybe my government violated a negative duty not to veto a certain Security 
2] This point is also made by Shei (2005). However, Shei’s criticism relies on what he calls “the contri-
bution condition” (148), which in my view is not a valid condition of moral responsibility. I also reject Shei’s 
own, enormously sweeping and counter-intuitive account of collective responsibility.
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Council resolution on behalf of an oppressed people. I certainly cannot have violated that 
duty, because it is logically impossible for me to violate that duty. I simply cannot veto 
Security Council resolutions.
In the same vein, and third of all, the fact that “we” as a collective violated a negative 
duty towards foreigners does not mean that the individual members of the collective 
violated a negative duty. Consider a collective like a football team that violates a negative 
duty by entering the game with more players than the rules of the game allow. The 
individual players are, again, not even logically able to violate that duty.
These examples show that two general claims are necessarily and clearly wrong: 
“Whenever my government or my state or country or ethnic group violates a duty I violate 
the same duty” and “Whenever my government or my state or country or ethnic group 
violates a duty I violate some correlative duty.” (Already the example of my government 
unjustly killing me and my foreign girlfriend suffices to show that both general “principles” 
are wrong.) Thus, Pogge cannot rely on these or similarly general principles in an attempt 
to derive the claim that “we” harm the global poor from the premise that a collective of rich 
countries or each individual rich country is doing so. Instead, he would have to provide a 
specific argument that shows and explains that and how “we” harm the global poor.
Pogge’s First Attempt to Bridge the Gap: The Upstream Factories and Joint Action
Yet, it is very difficult to find in Pogge’s work any passages providing an explanation 
as to how exactly “we” – the citizens of the rich societies, and not only our governments – 
violate negative duties towards the poor. Here is one, and I will quote it at length:
[...] I must not help uphold and impose upon [others] coercive social institutions 
under which they do not have secure access to the objects of their human rights. I 
would be violating this duty if, through my participation, I helped sustain a social 
order in which such access is not secure, in which blacks are enslaved, women 
disenfranchised, or servants mistreated, for example. Even if I owned no slave or 
employed no servants myself, I would still share responsibility: by contributing my 
labor to the society’s economy, my taxes to its governments, and so forth. I might 
honor my negative duty, perhaps, through becoming a hermit or an emigrant, but I 
could honor it more plausibly by working with others toward shielding the victims 
of injustice from the harms I help produce or, if this is possible, toward establishing 
secure access through institutional reform. (2002, 66)
This argument faces several problems. First of all, why and how exactly would I share 
responsibility just by contributing my labor to the society’s economy, my taxes to its 
government? How would I thereby harm the global poor or violate a negative duty3 towards 
them? To simply claim that I thereby share responsibility is certainly not enough.
Yet, Pogge might actually have an explanation. Elsewhere he considers
two upstream factories releasing chemicals into a river. The chemicals of each factory 
would cause little harm by themselves. But the mixture of chemicals from both plants 
3] There can of course still be other duties and responsibilities.
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causes huge harm downstream. In this sort of case, we must not hold each factory 
owner responsible for only the small harm he would be causing if the other did not 
pollute. This would leave unaccounted-for most of the harm they produce together 
and would thus be quite implausible. [P]rovided each factory owner knows about 
the effluent released by the other and can foresee the harmful effect they together 
produce, each owner bears responsibility for his marginal contribution, that is, for as 
much of the harm as would be avoided if he alone were not discharging his chemicals. 
Each factory owner is then responsible for most of the harm they jointly produce. 
(2005a, 48)
This account of collective responsibility, however, is not strong enough to support 
Pogge’s case. After all, it is safe to assume that the marginal harm the average citizen of the 
rich states produces by his or her participation in the economic process of his or her state 
is zero – or at least infinitesimally close to zero, so that the infinitesimally small amount 
of money we give to development aid or charities or invest in academic discussions on 
poverty might already be a sufficient compensation. Moreover, there is no argument 
available in the first place that could show that by dropping out of the economic process 
and by ceasing to pay taxes one could not also harm the global poor4 (cf. Reitberger 2008, 
389-90). This could mean one person less who buys their products. Elsewhere Pogge 
makes measures that impair the “export opportunities of even the very poorest countries” 
responsible for “a sizeable fraction of the 270 million poverty deaths since 1989” (2005a, 
50). Obviously, “our” dropping out of the economy and going into the woods would harm 
their export opportunities even more than the other measures Pogge mentions. Thus, it 
would “kill” more, not fewer people. And if many of “us” did not pay taxes, the state might 
perhaps try to compensate for missing revenue by cutting development aid that actually 
worked and by offering less for possible disaster relief. Pogge therefore simply has no 
evidence for his claim that by paying taxes or taking part in the economy “we” harm the 
global poor or violate a negative duty towards them.
To be sure, it is not correct that in cases of collective action people will always only 
be responsible for their marginal contribution. But then, again, it would be Pogge’s task to 
give us a mechanism that actually explains how we do become responsible. Since he does 
not do that (leaving aside his ideas about “delegation,” which we will turn to later), let us 
ourselves try to shed some light on the issue with the help of an analogy, namely with a 
clear case of unjustly imposing something on innocent people. This is the case of
Angela, the minions, and the ordinary citizens
In a remote, lawless area of country X there is a small town where Angela is the local 
strongwoman. She collects “taxes,” but she indeed provides protection in exchange 
and also sees to it that there are schools, health services, etc. If you do not pay the taxes, 
you will be imprisoned in her private jail for quite a while. The ordinary citizens pay, 
although they foresee that at some point Angela will use part of the money to hire 100 
minions (although 70 of them would also suffice) to help her to push the big rock on 
4] Cf. Reitberger 2008, 389-90.
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a cliff above the poor people’s boarding house over the edge, knowingly killing many 
poor people below. And this is indeed what happens in the end.
If country X is a Western jurisdiction, then (barring special circumstances) Angela 
and the minions are legally guilty of manslaughter or murder, and the ordinary citizens 
of nothing. Note that Angela and each of the minions is guilty of manslaughter or murder 
although the marginal contribution of each of them was zero: the non-participation of one 
of them would have made no difference at all. Yet, each of them participated in the unjust 
and foreseeably deadly imposition of a rock on innocent poor people, and thus each of 
them is guilty of murder or manslaughter.
We can also consider the situation from the perspective of self-defense law. The poor 
people below would certainly be justified in killing Angela and the minions above – all of 
them, if necessary to avert the attack. They have no such legal self-defense justification for 
killing any of the ordinary citizens paying taxes. They might have a necessity justification 
(under some US state jurisdictions) to kill a smaller number of the citizens – or, for that 
matter, of people from a completely different place – to save a larger number of themselves, 
the poor; but a necessity justification implies that the people who are harmed on its basis 
are innocent and wronged and their rights violated, even if justifiably so. 
Thus, from the legal perspective – and I submit from the perspective of common 
sense – Angela and the minions are participants in crime, but the ordinary citizens are 
not. Pogge might still claim that they are “implicated” in the crime by paying taxes, but 
now this looks like mere rhetoric. This kind of “implication,” after all, intuitively and 
legally does not amount to a participation in crime or to a violation of a negative duty.5 The 
application of this example to the case of the citizens of the rich countries and the global 
poor is obvious.
Second, suppose, for the sake of argument, that Pogge were right that by paying 
taxes and partaking in the global economy we do harm the global poor. Then he would 
certainly be wrong with his claims about what would constitute the most plausible way of 
not harming them (cf. also Hayward 2008, 5). To wit, by participating in a conspiracy to 
kill an innocent person and simultaneously hiring bodyguards to protect that person I do 
not honor my negative duty not to harm that person “more plausibly” than by abstaining 
from that conspiracy in the first place.6 If the conspiracy succeeds I will have harmed 
the victim and violated a negative duty towards him, whether I paid the bodyguards or 
5] Ci (2010, 90) recognizes that Pogge’s account of responsibility involves a “leap” but claims that 
“the leap is justified.” He provides no argument for the latter assessment and overlooks that it is not only unjust 
to unduly limit responsibility, but also to unduly expand it. 
6] A critic claimed that by “honoring a duty” Pogge means less than discharging it or complying with 
it, and that therefore my criticism here is a “red herring.” Seriously? First, I do not believe for a moment that 
Pogge really meant by “honoring” less than “complying with.” Second, if he did, then he might indeed be 
right – by definitional fiat – in claiming that one can “honor” a duty by merely compensating for its viola-
tion. The problem then, however, would be that one cannot discharge a duty by “honoring” it. And the duty 
demands that we discharge it, comply with it, not just “honor” it. Thus, my argument stands. 
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not. Nothing changes if we are not talking about a conspiracy to kill an innocent person 
(which implies an intention) but rather only about the foreseen killings of another person.7 
By simultaneously hiring a private security company that is notorious for its members’ 
penchant for rape and excessive, murderous violence and yet another private security 
company to protect the innocent people in the surrounding area from the first PSC, the 
CEO of a mining company somewhere in Africa certainly does not honor his negative 
duty not to harm the innocent persons in the surrounding area “more plausibly” than by 
abstaining from hiring the brutal and barbaric PSC in the first place. If the first company 
rapes women and kills innocent people he will have violated the negative duty, whether he 
hired the second company or not.
But what if the second security company succeeded in protecting the innocent? 
Well, Pogge does not require that in the above quote. “Working with others toward 
shielding the victims of injustice from the harms I help produce or, if this is possible, 
toward establishing secure access through institutional reform” is not the same as actually 
shielding them from the harm I help to produce. If the harm has occurred it has occurred; 
I cannot make that go away with reform efforts. As already Tim Hayward has pointed 
out against Pogge, compensating people for harm is simply not the same as not harming 
them; indeed, the possibility of compensation conceptually presupposes that the harm 
has occurred (Hayward 2008, 5). Thus, one can not discharge one’s negative duty not to 
harm by later making amends.
Elsewhere, however, Pogge distinguishes negative duties not to harm from 
“intermediate” duties “to avert harms that one’s own past conduct may cause in the 
future” (2005a, 34). Might discharging an intermediate duty to avert the harm that one’s 
past conduct may cause amount to discharging the negative duty not to harm? I think 
it would. If the second PSC really had successfully protected the innocent persons in 
the surrounding area of the mining company from encroachments by the first, brutal 
company, the CEO would indeed, all else being equal, have discharged his negative duty 
not to let the innocent people in the surrounding area of the mining company be harmed 
by the first security company. Nevertheless, he would not have discharged his negative 
duty not to impose a terrible and unnecessary risk upon them. If at this point someone asks, 
“What is the difference, since after all they did not really get physically harmed?”, I would 
invite the questioner to consider the case of someone telling a judge: “Yes, your honor, 
I indeed knowingly hired a serial child abuser as nurse for our kindergarten, but I also 
hired a private detective to keep an eye on him, and the latter indeed managed to keep 
the former all eight times from abusing a child. So what is the difference?” Isn’t it obvious?
Besides, while the CEO of the mining company might be able to keep the first 
Private Security Company from harming innocent people with the help of the second 
7] A condition for citizens’ responsibility for a human rights deficit caused by the “imposition” of 
an unjust institutional order is, on Pogge’s view, that they at least foresee that this order they cooperatively 
“impose” comes with those deficits. See Pogge 2005b, 60.
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one, there is no way that “we” can shield the global poor from the harm arising from the 
unjust institutional order to which we allegedly contribute by paying taxes. Interestingly, 
Pogge even thinks that the harm we cause is quantifiable. He claims that “our obligation 
to compensate is limited to the amount of harm for which we become responsible by 
cooperating in the imposition of an unjust social order” (2005b, 60-61). However, it is far 
from clear what that means. How much money do you have to pay to Oxfam in order to 
“compensate” for one month’s contribution to the unjust institutional order killing about 
20 million people every year? What impact factor does the journal need to have so that 
your article against global poverty compensates for 5 weeks of contribution? How can you 
possibly measure that? What is the unit of measurement? This is not only a “practical” or 
“epistemological” problem; it is a problem of intelligibility.
But we do not even have to go further into this. The global institutional order, 
according to Pogge, harms practically all the global poor. This means that by contributing 
to that institutional order you are contributing to harming all the poor affected by it. 
Suppose you gave all your money to Oxfam yesterday, and yet today thousands of poor 
people still died from poverty-related reasons. Obviously, you have not managed to avert 
the harm to them. You have not even contributed to averting the harm from them. If it had 
been averted, they would not be dead. The effects of the unjust global institutional order to 
which you contribute have killed them. So, even if your money shielded many other poor 
people today, it obviously did not shield those who died. You have not discharged your 
negative or intermediate duties towards them. (Recall also the “Angela” example: even if 
they simultaneously pay money to the “Help the poor below” program, Angela and the 
minions still remain guilty of murder or manslaughter if they kill many of the poor below 
by imposing a deadly rock on them.)
Thus, Pogge’s idea that by discharging a duty to compensate others for the harm 
you inflict on them you also discharge the underlying negative duty not to harm them is 
mistaken. However, even if this idea were not mistaken – if compensation were understood 
as shielding – the further idea that it is applicable to the relations between the global rich 
and the global poor is still mistaken.
Consequently, if by contributing my labor and my taxes to a government that 
imposes an unjust institutional order on others I am violating certain negative duties, 
then becoming a hermit is the only way to honor these negative duties. Secondly, by 
compensating someone for the harm I have done to her I am doing something or assisting 
someone, not refraining from doing something. I cannot, even in principle, discharge this 
duty by inaction. It is therefore certainly not a negative duty (unless one wants to engage 
in false labeling). That does not mean that it cannot have been derived somehow from the 
more fundamental negative duty. By violating that negative duty I might have incurred a 
positive duty to compensate. However, my point is that discharging that duty is not the 
same as discharging the more fundamental negative one.
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This finding has unfortunate consequences for Pogge’s argument,8 for duties 
sometimes conflict. My taxes do not only do harm, they also do good; for example, they 
help the poor and sick people in my own society. Besides, what about a mother and her 
special duties towards her children? Even if her only way to honor her negative duties 
towards the poor consists in becoming a hermit or an emigrant (and an emigrant to where 
and to what?), is she really morally required to do so, given her obligations towards her 
children? Intuitively, this seems to be not particularly plausible.
At this point Pogge’s idea that you can fulfill the negative duty not to harm the 
global poor by “compensatory” or “shielding” measures would come in handy for him, 
for it would shield him from the charge that he makes completely unreasonable, indeed 
morally unacceptable demands on the rich. He could say that he does not want to drive 
them into the woods, but only for them to pay money to Oxfam or organize or partake 
in reform movements. However, this escape route is blocked by my argument above. If 
Pogge is right that by paying taxes and partaking in the economy you harm the global 
poor, then he cannot also be right in claiming that you can cease harming them by 
simply adopting those alternative measures that Pogge thinks are “more plausible.” For 
the reasons adduced, they are anything but plausible; they simply cannot serve as a way 
to discharge the negative duties in question. Thus, in its present form Pogge’s theory is 
inconsistent.
Incidentally, Pogge also could not escape this problem by simply abandoning the 
negative duty not to harm and by claiming that we only have the more complex duty 
not to harm without compensation. For if we do not have a duty not to harm in the first 
place, why should we be obliged to compensate if we do harm? We can only be obliged to 
compensate for a violation of a duty if we in fact have violated a duty.
If, however, one insists – as Pogge must, as we just saw – that there is indeed a 
duty not to harm the poor, then Pogge’s theory demands far too much, as shown by the 
example of the mother required to live in the woods. Moreover, it should be noted that 
many of the poor also help to “uphold” the unjust global order, for example by working for 
transnational companies or mines or by transporting goods or people, etc. This would 
weaken their position considerably if they asked us to do otherwise. To be sure, one might 
argue that, as long as this order exists, we cannot reasonably expect the poor not to try 
to carve out a better life for themselves. But can this be expected of us? If they are not 
expected to live as hermits, why are we? Again, to say that the rich have other alternatives 
is to ignore the fact that this road is blocked. The only alternative is to live as a hermit. And 
it is not immediately clear why it should be more difficult for the poor to live in the woods 
as hermits without economical exchange with the rest of society than it would be for the 
rich. Besides, even if it were for some reasons more difficult – it might also be more difficult 
8] While Hayward (2008, 5) notes the difference between discharging one’s negative duty and 
compensating for its violation, he does not notice how extremely damaging the existence of this difference 
actually is for Pogge’s account.
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for a poor kid in a Brazilian favela than for one in a high school in Beverly Hills to resist 
becoming a contract killer. However, even if that were true, this greater difficulty might at 
best be a mitigating circumstance, not an excuse, let alone a justification. Analogously, if 
by partaking in the global economy you unjustly harm the poor, then you unjustly harm 
the poor – whether you are poor yourself or not.9
The Contradiction between Pogge’s Views on Poverty and His Views on Terrorism
Pogge’s problems do not end here. His idea that we (unjustly) harm the global poor or 
violate negative duties by doing such prima facie morally innocuous things as paying our 
taxes and going to work can also be undermined by an appeal to Pogge’s own assumption 
that human rights “are in principle enforceable.” That they are in principle enforceable 
means that someone’s omission or, more relevantly here, someone’s action can constitute 
a human rights violation “only in cases where it is morally permissible for some other 
agent to use some coercive means to force the relevant individual or collective” to desist 
from the omission or action (2005a, 44).
Is it permissible to force individuals in the rich countries into the woods, so that they 
do not continue upholding the unjust institutional order? Actually, this would intuitively 
seem to be a gross violation of their negative rights. If in an attempt to reach a “reflective 
equilibrium,” that is to reconcile our intuitions with our principles and philosophical 
positions, these intuitions prove to be more resilient and fundamental than Pogge’s 
position, then this speaks strongly in favor of rejecting Pogge’s position. I do in fact think 
that these intuitions I just appealed to are more resilient than Pogge’s position. They can 
also be further supported by an additional argument.
Just war theory provides the basis for this argument, by stating that non-combatants 
are not liable to direct attacks. It is widely accepted that, for example, a baker or a farmer 
is a non-combatant while a worker in a munitions factory is not. What is the difference? 
Jeffrie G. Murphy provides the following influential explanation:
The farmer qua farmer is, like the general, performing actions which are causally 
necessary for your destruction; but, unlike the general, he is not necessarily engaged 
in an attempt to destroy you. [...] The farmer’s role bears a contingent connection to 
the war effort whereas the general’s role bears a necessary connection to the war effort 
[...] The farmer is aiding the soldier qua human being whereas the general is aiding the 
soldier qua soldier or fighting man. (Murphy 1973, 532-34)
9] Note, by the way, that Pogge meanwhile realizes this problem, and therefore uses a mere “can” now 
(2010, 244 n. 48): “Only if the existing global order is unjust can our mere contribution to its imposition 
count as wrongful” (194). On the next page he again uses such a formulation with “can”. So the question 
arises (and this is a question for an account of collective responsibility): when does the mere contribution 
to its imposition count as wrongful? The answer comes still a page later: if you are “affluent” (196). And why 
does it count if you are affluent but not when you are poor? As to be expected, Pogge provides absolutely no 
explanation, thus “implicating” the rich and exempting the poor by way of dogmatic stipulation.
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In other words, the mere fact that a farmer is producing food which might then, in 
part, be eaten by the soldiers does not yet make the farmer liable to attack – and therefore, 
to draw on Pogge’s assumption, he cannot be violating the negative rights of the enemy 
soldiers (not even if they are on the just side). Of course, a farmer could quite deliberately 
support an aggressive war with additional payments to the cause and with propaganda or 
other means. And this might indeed make him liable to attack (although it might still, for 
consequentialist, particularly rule-utilitarian, reasons, be unjustifiable to attack him, but 
this lack of justification would no longer be due to a right of the farmer not to be attacked). 
In my view, this is a very plausible position. Although the first farmer, the one who does not 
deliberately support the war, is still causally contributing to the war effort, “upholding” it, 
this does not mean that he is violating others’ rights. He is just going about his business, as 
he did before the war, and this business is not, not even in a time of war, directly devoted to 
destroying other people. He cannot reasonably be expected to give up his work (especially, 
by the way, as this work not only feeds soldiers but is also necessary to feed innocents – 
for example children). Analogously, by simply living in a rich country and working and 
paying taxes there, one is not sufficiently and in the relevant way implicated in the plight of 
the poor to become liable to coercion by a third party in defense of the poor. 
To be sure, liability to attack and enforceability are not the same standards. My right 
that others do not steal my cookie is enforceable: if someone tries to steal it, I have the 
right to prevent this, if necessary by force. Yet, given that a cookie is not of huge value, there 
apply certain proportionality constraints. Although the thief is liable to some force, he is 
not liable to deadly attack. However, we are not talking about cookies here but, according 
to Pogge, about the “largest […] crime against humanity ever committed.” We are talking 
about starving people to death. And of course Pogge does regard the participation in this 
crime as a human rights violation. Thus, his premises that human rights are enforceable 
and that we are “active participants” in their massive violation and his ideas about what 
counts as such “participation” do imply that “we” are becoming liable to attack just by 
buying salad dressings in a supermarket or paying taxes.10
At least it does imply this if Pogge accepts a correct understanding of human rights. 
As a critic pointed out to me, Pogge could just flatly deny – but I seriously doubt that he 
would – that human rights are enforceable by more than ordinary governing institutions 
and the coercive imposition of tax burdens (for the benefit of the poor). Yes, he could. 
A philosopher, for example, who claims that all human beings deserve an apple and 
denies that any human being deserves a physical object does not involve himself in a 
contradiction as long as he denies that apples are physical objects. Thus, he would have 
achieved the coherence of his account at the price of its blatant incorrectness. What we 
obviously want, however, are accounts that are not only coherent but correct. And hence 
the question becomes whether Pogge’s account is still coherent in conjunction with what we 
10] That “we” become liable does not yet mean that it is justified to attack us, only that we have lost the 
right not to be attacked. See also my further comments in the next paragraphs.
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know about the world – in particular in conjunction with what we know about the human 
right to life. The answer is that it is not.
Remember the “Angela” example. Angela and the minions are liable to defensive 
attack – and thus not only to taxation – when they try to impose the rock onto the poor 
below. They are liable to attack because they are themselves participating in an unjust 
attack on the poor, violating their right to life. (Even the unjust potentially lethal attack 
on a person is a violation of the person’s right to life and not just the successful attack. 
If, however, one would like to take the latter position, this would only show that less 
than a violation of a right to life can be enough to justify lethal counter-measures.) The 
ordinary citizens of the example, however, are not liable to attack, precisely because they 
are not participating in a rights-violation. Thus, in the light of the actual normative status 
and implications of the right to life, a responsible adult person is either not unjustifiably 
violating another person’s right to life or liable to potentially lethal counter-attack. One 
simply cannot have it both ways.
But it seems that “we” are not liable to potentially lethal attack. This then implies that 
“we” do not violate “their” human rights and hence are not active participants in the largest 
crime against humanity ever committed.11
Incidentally, Pogge actually agrees that “we” are not liable to attack – which seriously 
undermines his position. Discussing the attack on the World Trade Center in September 
2001 he claims that the majority killed in these attacks were innocent, and he explains:
By calling a person innocent, I mean that this person poses no threat and has done 
nothing that would justify attacking her with lethal force. (2008, 5)
However, the majority of the people (practically all) killed in those attacks were 
active participants in the world economic system and also taxpayers and thus “active 
participants in the largest … crime against humanity ever committed.” Still, he thinks 
that they are not liable to attack. But if they are not liable to attack then, according to his 
own premises, they cannot be violators of human rights. Pogge’s position is inconsistent.
It is, by the way, irrelevant that al-Qaeda did not attack those and other civilians 
because they were harming the global poor (as such) but for other reasons. If the civilians 
had not been innocent, the attack could still have been unjustified, for reasons Pogge 
mentions himself: for example the attacks were not necessary to achieve the good or 
supposed good the terrorists aimed at; or they were not in the least likely to contribute to 
achieving it. Yet, the intentions that guide an attack on a person are completely irrelevant 
for the liability of the targets – a person that is killed for the wrong reasons can still have 
been liable to attack, can still have done something that would have justified attacking 
her with lethal force. But Pogge insists that those taxpaying civilians who, working in the 
World Trade Center, will have “upheld” the unjust international institutional order to a 
11] To be sure, this argument does not contradict the possibility that we are harming them in some 
way below the threshold of human rights violations.
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much greater extent than most of “us,” are innocent. Thus, the argument stands: Pogge’s 
position is inconsistent.
Just for the sake of argument: What would happen with this argument if Pogge or a 
Poggean would bite the bullet and say that “we” are liable to attack? Would this then not 
make my argument question-begging? After all, if Pogge were right that we are violating 
the human rights of the poor, then the conclusion that “we” are liable to attack might indeed 
be correct. This conclusion could, it seems, not be rejected by simply postulating that we 
are not liable to attack and then conveniently deriving the falsity of Pogge’s premises.
However, this is a misunderstanding. I would not have to present my appeal to just 
war theory and Pogge’s enforceability requirement as a knock-down argument against 
a radicalized Poggean. If Pogge had actually shown that “we” are violating human rights, 
I would without any hesitance say that we are liable to attack. However, as I have argued 
in this paper, Pogge has nowhere come near to showing anything of this sort. Thus, even 
against a radicalized Poggean the argument in terms of just war theory would still work 
as an appeal to plausibility considerations: we weigh the plausibility of the conclusion of 
the argument in question against Pogge’s contradicting claims. Given that, as it seems, 
our intuitions and just war theory are able to give very strong support to the thesis that 
“we” are not liable to attack even if this is the only way to keep us from shopping, paying 
taxes or going to work, whereas Pogge is not able to muster arguments or intuitions that 
undermine this thesis, the argument by appeal to just war theory further confirms my 
skeptical stance towards the claims even of a more consistent Poggean.
Pogge’s Second Attempt to Bridge the Gap: Political Representation12
Let me finally turn to Pogge’s attempt to use the concept of “political representation” 
to impute on us the largest crime against humanity ever committed. Arguing against 
Debra Satz, who is also rightly skeptical with regard to Pogge’s accusations against “us,” 
the citizens of the rich countries (Satz 2005, esp. 50-51),13 Pogge says:
Our politicians and negotiators wield powers we delegate. Their decisions and 
agreements would be of little consequence if they were not so empowered by us. 
12] To be sure, there are other accounts of collective or national responsibility, but none of those 
other accounts is invoked by Pogge; and I do not have the space to deal with them here. I intend, however, 
to deal at least with David Miller’s well-known account of national responsibility on another occasion. 
Suffice it to say here that, in my view, Miller’s account fails for some of the same reasons Pogge’s appeal to 
political representation fails.
13] I am even more skeptical than she is. Satz believes in something she calls “civic responsibility – the 
responsibility of each citizen to do her part in honoring the state’s obligations.” This seems to be the outward-
oriented sister of the inward-oriented political obligation. I have yet to come across a plausible argument for 
political obligation; and the situation of civic responsibility does not appear to be better. See also my remarks 
on “political representation” and “delegation of power” below. Pogge’s reply to Satz, by the way, misses the 
point. See in particular his use of the example of the campaign against slavery in Manchester in 1787, see 
Pogge 2005b, 81ff. Maybe “we” could indeed eradicate poverty. But that is not the issue here. The issue is 
whether we are violating a negative duty or are harming someone if we do not eradicate it.
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[...] Satz is quite wrong to believe that the obscurity of political decision-making 
disconnects us from responsibility. We cannot disown responsibility for how our 
politicians and negotiators wield our collective power by appeal to our own failure to 
insist on transparency and accountability. (2005b, 79)
While I completely agree with Pogge that one cannot dissociate oneself from 
responsibility by one’s own failure to insist on transparency and accountability, it still has 
to be noted that this is not the issue. The issue is whether by “delegating” one’s power to a 
rich state a citizen of this state is violating a negative duty or harming someone. And the 
claim that he does is, again, vulnerable to the series of arguments I have adduced above.
However, the word “delegate” sounds of course very “political.” Perhaps the 
delegation of power Pogge is talking about does not merely involve the paying of taxes 
or the involvement in the economic process. Maybe it has something to do with what is 
called “democratic representation.” After all, Pogge also says that “our collective power is 
wielded in our name” (2005b, 79).
But – so what? To be fair, there are certain interpretations of democratic theory 
which might have an answer to this obvious question. Michael Green, for example, claims 
in the context of just war theory:
In a perfect democracy each and every person would be [...] fully responsible, because 
if the method of consent has been in operation, each has agreed to the decision 
reached by that method, or, if not that, to be bound by whatever decision was reached 
by that method. [...] Within democratic theory, it is not clear that even children, the 
insane, and the mentally handicapped are innocent. These have guardians who 
represent their interests. These guardians are still bound by and to the general will of 
the society in which they find themselves in representing their interests. Thus, even if 
as a matter of fact political authorities are responsible for most wars and citizens are 
usually forced into being soldiers against their will, it is not clear that this absolves 
them from responsibility if they were responsible for letting themselves be put in 
circumstances in which they are so passive. (Green 1992, 51-52) 
These ideas, it seems, could also be applied to the issue of radical inequality. The 
problem, however, is that here Green might give us a more or less accurate characterization 
of totalitarian democracy à la Rousseau, but the current paradigm is the liberal-democratic 
one. And the characteristic of liberal democracy is precisely that the individual is not 
required to accept whatever is collectively decided. Rather, such decisions are constrained 
by the space of individual rights. Since Pogge also wants to cater to libertarians, it is 
worthwhile to take note of what John Locke has to say about the idea of the responsibility 
of the whole populace:
For the People having given to their Governors no Power to do an unjust thing, such 
as is to make an unjust War, (for they never had such a Power in themselves:) They 
ought not to be charged, as guilty of the Violence and Unjustice that is committed 
in an Unjust War, any farther, than they actually abet it; no more, than they are to be 
thought guilty of any Violence or Oppression their Governors should use upon the 
People themselves, or any part of their Fellow Subjects, they having impowered them 
no more to the one, than to the other. (Locke 2002, 388, § 179)
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To be sure, Locke does not deny that citizens can be guilty to the degree that 
they do abet the crimes of their government. And I agree with him. I do not deny that, 
for example, citizens of a democratic state who vote for a known war criminal as prime 
minister or president then become liable to attack if this man is committing crimes of 
aggression against other peoples.14 The voters who voted for a decent person, however, do 
not become liable to attack. Moreover, deliberately voting for a known war criminal is one 
thing; paying taxes, going to work and buying in supermarkets is something completely 
different. It does certainly not amount to “abetting.” Thus, Pogge’s appeal to the delegation 
of power does not support his sweeping claims about the individual responsibility of not 
only some of us but of “us,” period.
Moreover, the claim that “we” delegate our power to our so-called political 
“representatives” is wrong. Let me illustrate this contention by first looking at an 
uncontroversial example of the delegation of power: I have some legal matter to settle. I 
look for a lawyer, find someone I like and trust, tell him what to do and sign a grant of 
power of attorney which says that the settlements she reaches are binding on me. That is 
delegation of power. Even here, however, her actions are not mine, not even actions she 
commits in my name. Strangely, Pogge at one point goes so far as to say that the conduct of 
“our elected representatives” is our conduct (2008, 22). However, for obvious logical and 
conceptual reasons the conduct of another entity (be it a person or an institution) cannot 
be mine. (If, however, it were, then all adult citizens of a country waging an unjust war would 
be liable to attack. Their president’s waging the war would be their waging the war. Pogge 
just cannot have it both ways.) And if the lawyer decides to threaten other people at gun 
point to sign contracts favorable to me, I do not bear the slightest responsibility for this if I 
could not reasonably foresee or suspect that this would happen. If I am informed that this 
lawyer acts in this way, I should fire her. (Yet, my last attempts at firing the chief executive 
of my state or giving her instructions on the phone on how to handle the banking crisis 
were unsuccessful.)
The case of political “delegation of power” is not like the lawyer example. It is more 
like this: I am born in a certain country. At some point I realize that the whole country 
has been taken over by one law firm. It has the monopoly. Every attempt of other people 
within the country to form their own law firm is crushed by the Überfirm. Any attempt 
by people to let their national legal matters be handled by one of the foreign law firms is 
crushed by the national Überfirm. Whenever I try to buy something or import something, 
the Überfirm comes and forces me to pay “handling fees” to them. When I call the 
management of the Überfirm and tell them that I do not want their “services” any more, 
they tell me that I am crazy. Mostly, I do not even get connected: “Don’t call us, we call 
you.” However, for public relations reasons, to enhance the company’s acceptance in the 
14] Again, that they become liable to attack, that they are not innocent in the relevant sense, that they 
lose their right not to be attacked does not yet mean that they may be attacked. Further considerations would 
come into play here (these are, however, not relevant in the present context). See Steinhoff 2007, 130-32.
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population, it some time ago came up with the idea of allowing the population to vote for 
the highest executives of the firm. Theoretically, everyone is eligible; in practice, however, 
only people that have for many years been allied with one of the major “parties” within the 
firm, the Business as Usual Party and The Business as Usual with Cream on Top Party, have 
any real chance to get elected. Sometimes I vote, persuading myself that by doing so I can 
somehow contribute to the lesser of two evils being elected; sometimes I do not.
At no point have I signed any grant of power of attorney stating that I authorize the 
Überfirm to settle matters in my name or that what they decide is binding on me. By voting I do 
not give any of those I vote for (let alone those I do not vote for but who will be elected 
anyway) any permission or authorization to “represent” me or to speak in my name. I just 
try to exert influence, however marginal, on who will claim to represent me and will in fact 
make decisions that will greatly affect me, whether I like those decisions or not. Moreover, 
I try to exert this influence in a situation where I know that in the end, whether I like it or 
not, someone will claim to represent me and make decisions in my name. So where is the 
“delegation of power” here? As a simple matter of fact: there isn’t any. I did not delegate any 
power; rather, I tried to somehow influence a power that is already there, and perhaps much 
so against my wishes (thus, by voting for a certain person within an unjust institution I 
certainly did not vote for that unjust institution itself).15
Let me give a second example. There is a big transnational corporation, which, among 
other things, also owns a private military company with which poor people sometimes 
have enormously unpleasant encounters. As a public relations measure, the corporation 
decides to allow people all over the world to elect its CEO, and it offers five candidates. 
Two women in Sudan think that this is a good opportunity to have at least some beneficial 
influence on this nasty corporation, and they vote for the least disgusting of the five 
candidates. He indeed gets elected, and soon after has the private military company, “in 
the name of all those fine people who elected me,” invade Liberia to set up a lucrative 
mining company. Many Liberians get killed in the process. Is this invasion the act of the 
two Sudanese women? Obviously not. Do the two women share in the responsibility for 
the invasion and for the unjust killings? That is utterly counter-intuitive. If Pogge thinks 
otherwise, then he would have much explaining to do. It is not only that the two woman 
did not delegate any power, they also did not delegate any power (nor do “we” by voting). 
What “power” are they supposed to have “delegated?” Pogge simply claims that by voting 
for our alleged “representatives” we are automatically responsible for the wrongs they do. 
For the reasons given, this claim is not only entirely unwarranted, it is also wrong.
15] Incidentally, whether the citizens could overcome the Überfirm if they collectively acted against 
it is completely beside the point. I might also be able to overcome a robber who is robbing somebody else. 
That does not mean that by not overcoming the robber I violate a negative duty, however much the robber 
might claim to act on my behalf and however often I said on earlier occasions: “Well, if we cannot com-
pletely get rid of robbers, than I’d rather have him.”
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III. CONCLUSION
In this paper I argued that Pogge’s charge that “we” are harming the global poor or 
violating our negative duties towards them is unjustified and indeed wrong.
I first challenged his rather blanket claim that if “our” governments or states harm 
people or violate negative duties towards them, then “we” do so as well. I then argued 
that indeed even Pogge’s own assumptions, in combination with some entirely plausible 
additional premises, imply that we do not harm the global poor or violate our negative 
duties towards them. 
1. Using several examples I showed that two general claims are necessarily and 
clearly wrong: “Whenever my government or my state or country or ethnic group violates 
a duty I violate the same duty” and “Whenever my government or my state or country or 
ethnic group violates a duty I violate some correlative duty.” Thus, Pogge would have to 
give a specific argument that shows and explains that and how “we” harm the global poor.
2. The only mechanism Pogge mentions, however, is that we are paying taxes and 
taking part in the economy, and thereby somehow “contribute” to upholding the unjust 
institutional order. Yet, it is not clear why and how we thereby harm the global poor or 
violate a negative duty towards them. His example for sharing in collective responsibility, 
the example of the two upstream factories releasing chemicals into a river, completely 
undermines his case: the marginal harm the average citizen of the rich states produces by 
his participation in the economic process of his state is zero – or at least infinitesimally 
close to zero. In fact, perhaps it is even negative: Pogge simply has no evidence for his 
claim that by paying taxes or taking part in the economy “we” harm the global poor or 
violate a negative duty towards them. 
3. Pogge’s idea that by discharging a duty to compensate others for the harm you 
inflict on them you also discharge the underlying negative duty not to harm them is 
mistaken. It is also mistaken to suggest that one could shield the poor from the harm 
allegedly produced by paying taxes or partaking in the global economy.
4. Consequently, if by contributing my labor and my taxes to a government that 
imposes an unjust institutional order on others I am violating certain negative duties, then 
becoming a hermit is the only way to honor these negative duties. However, then it seems 
that these duties are unreasonably demanding – and unreasonably demanding not only 
on the rich, but also on many poor – and therefore cannot be valid duties at all.
5. Pogge could not escape this problem by simply dropping the negative duty not 
to harm and by claiming that we only have the more complex duty not to harm without 
compensation. For if we do not have a duty not to harm in the first place, why should we 
be obliged to compensate if we do harm? We can only be obliged to compensate for a 
violation of a duty if we in fact have violated a duty.
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6. On Pogge’s own assumption human rights “are in principle enforceable.” He also 
claims that “we” are active participants in the world economic system and taxpayers and 
thus “active participants in the largest […] crime against humanity ever committed.” Yet, 
he claims that most of “us” are “innocent,” that is, that we pose no threat and most of “us” 
have “done nothing that would justify attacking [us] with lethal force.” This position is 
inconsistent. If “we” really have done nothing that would justify attacking us with lethal 
force, then we can hardly be active participants in the largest crime against humanity ever 
committed.
In the last section of this paper I dealt with Pogge’s attempt to use the concept of 
“political representation” or “delegation of power” to impute on us the responsibility for 
harming the global poor or violating a negative duty towards them. This attempt fails for 
three reasons: 
1. As Locke emphasizes, simply being the subject of a government (including a liberal-
democratic one) does not make one responsible for the crimes that that government or 
state commits. One is only responsible to the degree that one actually abets those crimes. 
However, simply paying taxes or taking part in the economy cannot count as “abetting” 
(not least for reasons already adduced). 
2. The claim that “we” delegate our power to our so-called political “representatives” 
is wrong. I tried to show this by comparing real delegation of power, for example by 
signing a grant of power of attorney, with what actually happens in states. There simply 
is no relationship between citizens and states that could in any literal sense be described 
as a delegation of powers from the individual to the state. There is rather the assumption of 
power by the state.
3. Voting for someone does not automatically make us responsible for the act of the 
person we voted for if this person is actually elected, as my example with the two Sudanese 
woman shows. Moreover, voting for a person within an institution does not amount to 
voting for the institution.
I conclude that Pogge’s claim that “we” are harming the global poor or violating 
negative duties towards them or with regard to them is unwarranted and, moreover, 
wrong.16
ustnhoff@hku.hk
16] For comments on earlier versions of this article I thank the members of the Centre for the 
Study of Social Justice, Oxford, in particular Daniel Butt, G. A. Cohen, David Miller, and Adam Swift; 
the participants of the Primer Coloquio Peruano de Filosofía Analítica; the audience of a talk I gave at 
the Department of Philosophy, University of Hong Kong, in particular Jiwei Ci, Alexandra Cook, Max 
Deutsch, Chris Fraser, Chad Hansen, William Haines, and Timothy O’Leary; and the audience of my ses-
sion on Pogge at the conference “Global Justice: Norms and Limits” at the University of Bucharest. I owe 
special thanks to Bashshar Haydar, who discussed Pogge with me on several occasions, and to Gabriela 
Barolo as well as to Luc Foisneau for providing written comments on the first draft.
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